هیئة سوق رأس المال Capital Market Authority

الإشارة: ه.س.ر.ف/ ديوان 2025/28778

التاريخ: 2025/2/24

حضرة السادة بورصة فلسطين المحترمين

حضرة السادة شركات الأوراق المالية المحترمين

حضرة السادة شركات التأمين المحترمين

حضرة السادة شركات التأجير التمويلي المحترمين

تحيه طيبة وبعد،


الموضوع: تعميم قرار بشأن قوائم الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة.

بالإشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه، واستناداً إلى أحكام القرار بقانون رقم (39) لسنة 2022 بشأن مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، وبناءً على القرار الصادر عن السادة وحدة المتابعة المالية رقم (2025/1) بشأن قوائم الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة.

ولحماية النظام المالي من اية مخاطر تتعلق بجرائم غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب أو انتشار التسلح، يتوجب على كافة القطاعات الخاضعة لإشراف ورقابة الهيئة تنفيذ متطلبات القرار أعلاه، واتخاذ التدابير اللازمة بمقتضاه.

كما وتتوه الهيئة، لضرورة الأخذ بعين الاعتبار المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه قصور أنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب للدول المدرجة في القائمة الرمادية وذلك عند اجراء التقييم الذاتي لمخاطر غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب. كما ويجب ان يتم تطبيق النهج القائم على المخاطر الذي يأخذ بعين الاعتبار كافة عوامل المخاطر المتعلقة بالعملاء، والمنتجات والخدمات والعمليات، وقنوات التسليم، والدول والمناطق الجغرافية بحيث تكون الإجراءات المتخذة متناسبة ومتسقة مع نتائج تحليل المخاطر المختلفة وطبيعة تلك المخاطر.

وتفضلوا بقبول فائق الاحترام



براق التابلسي المدير العام

- مرفق قرار رقم (2025/1) الصادر عن وحدة المتابعة المالية بتاريخ 2025/2/23.
 - نسخة الإدارة العامة للأوراق المالية.
 - نسخة الإدارة العامة للتأمين.
 - نسخة الإدارة العامة للرهن العقاري والتأجير التمويلي.

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Financial Follow-Up Unit State of Palestine



وحـــدة المتابعــة الماليــة دولة فلسطين

قراررقم (2025/1) صادر عن وحدة المتابعة المالية بتاريخ 2025/02/23م

بشأن قوائم الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة

استناداً إلى احكام قراربقانون رقم (39) لسنة 2022م بشأن مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب وتعديلاته، لا سيما أحكام المادة (20) والفقرات (3، 4) من المادة (30)، وبناءً على قرار اللجنة الوطنية لمكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب رقم (8/ج4/2016) الصادر بتاريخ 2016/12/01م، بشأن تفويض وحدة المتابعة المالية بنشر قائمة الدول عالية المخاطر والتي تصدر بشكل دوري عن مجموعة العمل المالي (FATF)، ولاحقاً لما تقرر عن المجموعة منذ تاريخ 2020/02/21، وحتى تاريخ 2025/02/21 وحتى تاريخ 2025/02/21 الصادر بتاريخ 2020/02/21 الصادر بتاريخ 2020/02/21 الصادر بتاريخ 2020/02/24 بشأن الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة، ولاحقاً الى قرار وحدة المتابعة رقم (2020/1) بتاريخ 2020/02/22 م والقرارات اللاحقة له بشأن قو انم الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة.

أولاً قائمة الدول مرتفعة المخاطر (القائمة السوداء)

يجب على كافة المؤسسات المالية والاعمال والمهن غير المالية المحددة في دولة فلسطين استمرار العمل بالإجراءات التالية تجاه الدول عالية المخاطر:

| الإجراءات المطلوبة تجاه الدول | الدّولة |
|--|-----------------------|
| تطبيق العقوبات المالية المستهدفة بما ينسجم مع احكام المرسوم التنفيذي رقم | - جمهورية كوريا |
| (2022/14) بشأن تنفيذ قرارات مجلس الأمن. | الديموقراطية الشعبية |
| 2. إيلاء اهتمام خاص للعلاقات التجاربة والمعاملات مع تلك الدول، بما في ذلك | (كوريا الشمالية). |
| الشركات والمؤسسات المالية، وتطبيق الإجراءات المضادة التالية: | |
| أ. اتخاذ اجراءات العناية الواجبة المعززة على علاقات العمل والعمليات مع تلك | - الجمهورية الإسلامية |
| الدُّول (كجزء من التدابير المضادة)، وبِما يتناسب مع المخاطر الناشئة فيها، وذلك | الإير انية (إيران). |
| وفق تفاصيل المواد (26، 27) من تعليمات اللجنة الوطنية رقم (4) لسنة 2022م | |
| الخاصة بالمؤسسات المالية، والمواد (24، 25) من تعليمات اللجنة الوطنية رقم | |
| (3) لسنة 2022م الخاصة بالأعمال والمهن غير المالية المحددة. | With the second |

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وحدة المتابعة المالية

دولة فلسطين

| تطبيق إجراءات العناية الواجبة المعززة المشار اليها في الفقرة (أ) من هذا البند عند | پ, |
|---|----|
| التعامل مع أي جهة تعمل بالنيابة عن الشخص الطبيعي او الاعتباري بما فبها | |
| الشركات أو المؤسسات المالية العاملة في تلك الدول. | |
| at a su of the many of the formand of the | |

- ج. تعزيز آليات الإبلاغ المعتمدة لدى المؤسسة المالية أو احدى الاعمال والمهن غير المالية، بما يشمل زيادة التعاون بين الموظفين وسرعة تزويد البيانات لمسؤول مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب داخل المؤسسة المالية أو احدى الاعمال والمهن غير المالية، وذلك لضمان عدم تنفيذ أي عملية أو معاملة يشتبه بأنها تتضمن جريمة غسل الأموال أو احدى الجرائم الاصلية المرتبطة بها أو تمويل الإرهاب، وإبلاغ الوحدة بصورة فورية ودون تأخير عن هذا الاشتباه، وتزويدها بكافة البيانات المتعلقة بمحاولة ابرام تلك العمليات، مع ضمان سرية الإبلاغ وعدم اشعار العميل.
 - د. عدم إنشاء فروع او مكاتب تمثيلية أو شركات تابعة في تلك الدول.
- ه. عدم الاعتماد على أطراف ثالثة متواجدة في تلك الدول في اتخاذ أي من إجراءات العناية الواجبة تجاه العملاء.
- عدم إنشاء أي علاقات مراسلة مصرفية أو علاقات مراسلة مشابهة مع المؤسسات المالية في تلك الدول.
- أ. تطبيق اجراءات العناية الواجبة المعززة على علاقات العمل والعمليات مع ماينمار ، وبما يتناسب مع المخاطر الناشئة في الدولة، وذلك وفق تفاصيل المواد (26، 27) من تعليمات اللجنة الوطنية رقم (4) لسنة 2022م الخاصة بالمؤسسات المالية، والمواد (25، 24) من تعليمات اللجنة الوطنية رقم (3) لسنة 2022م الخاصة بالأعمال والمهن غير المالية المحددة.
- عند تطبيق تدابير العناية الواجبة المعززة، يجب ضمان عدم تعطيل تدفقات الأموال
 للمساعدة الإنسانية وأنشطة المنظمات غير الربحية المشروعة والتحويلات المالية.

جمهوریة اتحاد ماینمار (ماینمار).

ثانيا

قائمة الدول تحت المتابعة المعززة (القائمة الرمادية)

تعديل قائمة الدول تحت المتابعة المعززة (القائمة الرمادية) المنصوص عليها في قرار الوحدة رقم (2024/3) وذلك بإضافة كلّ من (جمهورية لاو الديمقراطية الشعبية (لاو)، وجمهورية نئيال الديمقراطية الاتحادية (نئيال))، وحذف (جمهورية الفليين)، لتصبح القائمة كما بالجدول أدناه، والأخذ بعين الاعتبار المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه القصور في أنظمة مكافحة

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وححدة المتابعة الماليــة

دولة فلسطين

غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب لهذه الدول (وفقاً للملحق المرفق بهذا القرار) وذلك عند اجراء التقييم الذاتي لمخاطر غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب بما يشمل تحديد وتحليل وتقييم تلك المخاطر.

| اسم الدولة | الرقم | اسم الدولة | الرقم |
|---|-------|---------------------------------------|-------|
| موناكو | 14 | الجزائر | 1 |
| جمهورية موزمبيق | 15 | أنغولا | 2 |
| جمهوربة ناميبيا | 16 | بلغاربا | 3 |
| جمهورية نيبال الديمقراطية الاتحادية (نيبال) | 17 | بوركينا فاسو | 4 |
| جمهورية نيجيريا | 18 | الكاميرون | 5 |
| جمهورية جنوب افريقيا | 19 | ساحل العاج (كوت ديفوار) | 6 |
| جمهورية جنوب السودان | 20 | كرواتيا | 7 |
| الجمهورية العربية السورية (سوريا) | 21 | جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية | 8 |
| جمهورية تنزانيا | 22 | جمهوربة هايتي | 9 |
| فتزويلا | 23 | جمهورية كينيا | 10 |
| فيتنام | 24 | جمهورية لاو الديمقراطية الشعبية (لاو) | 11 |
| الجمهورية اليمنية (اليمن) | 25 | جمهورية لبنان | 12 |
| | | جمهورية مالي | 13 |

ثالثاً

التنفيذ

يجب على كافة المؤسسات المالية والأعمال والمهن غير المالية المحددة، تنفيذ أحكام هذا القرار ويعمل به من تاريخ تعميمه.

مديروحدة اللتاكعة المالية

د. فراس مرار

الموفق: المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه القصور في أنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب

المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه القصور في أنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب

المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه القصور في أنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب في الدول

القسم الأول: أوجه القصور من خلال تقارير التقييم (لكافة الدول):

يوضح هذا القسم، كيفية الوصول الى المخاوف المتعلقة بنظام مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب وتمويل انتشار التسلح لدى الدول المدرجة في القائمة الرمادية، إضافة الى كافة الدول الأخرى التي تخضع للتقييم المتبادل من قبل مجموعة العمل المالي أو المجموعات النظيرة، ويمكن الوصـــول الى تلك المخاوف من الاطلاع على تقارير التقييم المتبادل المتعلقة بتلك الدول، والتقارير المتابعة اللاحقة لهذا التقرير.

وتحتوي تقارير التقييم المتبادل التقييم المتبادل (mutual evaluation reports) وتقارير المتابعة (follow-up reports) المنشورة على موقع مجموعة العمل المالي أو مجموعة العمل المالي لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا، على كافة أوجه القصور والاستنتاجات الرئيسية المتعلقة بنظام مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب في الدول المدرجة على قائمة المتابعة المعززة وكافة الذول الأخرى التي خضعت للتقييم، ويمكن الحصول على تلك وفق الآلية التالية:

- أ. الوصول الى تقاربر التقييم المتبادل باللغة الإنجليزية (لكافة الدول).
 - الدخول الى الموقع الالكتروني: www.fatf-gafi.org
 - 2. من قائمة المواضيع (Topics) نختار (Mutual Evaluations).
 - 3. أختر Mutual Evaluations Reports.
- 4. البحث عن اسم الدولة باللغة الإنجليزية على نافذة البحث الموضحة بالصورة الموضحة جانباً.
 - ب. الوصــول الى تقارير التقييم المتبادل باللغة العربية (للدول الخاضعة لتقييم مجموعة العمل المالي لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا).
 - 1. الدخول الى الموقع الالكتروني:
 - www.menafatf.org/ar .2
 - اختيار بند (التقييم المتبادل) ثم (تقارير التقييم الجولة الثانية من التقييم)، أو تقارير المتابعة.
 - 4. اختيار التقرير من القائمة التي تظهر حسب اسم الدولة.



القسم الثاني: تنفيذ خطط العمل لمعالجة أوجه القصور

قدّمت الدول المدرجة على القائمة الرمادية التزاماً سياسياً عالياً لمعالجة أوجه القصور الاستراتيجية المتعلقة بأنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، وما زالت تلك الدول تتفذ التزاماتها لمعالجة باقي أوجه القصور.

وتوضح البنود ادناه المحاور الأساسية التي تعمل تلك الدول على معالجتها أو تلك التي تم معالجتها والتي تعتمد على أوجه القصور المحددة وفقاً لتقارير التقييم المتبادل وتقارير المتابعة، حيث يجب أخذها بعين الاعتبار سواء كانت سلبية أم إيجابية:

| الدولة | المحاور الأساسية |
|---------|---|
| Algeria | In October 2024, Algeria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its mutual evaluation report (MER) in May 2023, Algeria has made progress on many of the MER's recommended actions including by more effectively pursuing money laundering investigations and prosecutions. Algeria will continue to work with FATF to implement its action plan by: (1) improving risk-based supervision, especially for higher risk sectors, including through the adoption of new procedures, risk assessments, supervision manuals and guidelines, as well as undertaking inspections and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions; (2) developing an effective framework for basic and beneficial ownership information; (3) enhancing its regime for suspicious transaction reports; (4) establishing an effective legal and institutional framework for targeted financial sanctions for terrorism financing; and (5) implementing a risk-based approach to oversight of non-profit organisations, without disrupting or discouraging legitimate activity. |
| Angola | In October 2024, Angola made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in June 2023, Angola has made progress on some of the MER's recommended actions including enhancing national cooperation and coordination, international cooperation and the use of financial intelligence by competent authorities. Angola will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) enhancing its understanding of ML/TF risks; (2) improving risk-based supervision of non-financial banking entities and DNFBPs; (3) ensuring competent authorities have adequate, accurate and timely access to beneficial ownership information and that breaches to obligations are adequately addressed; (4) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions; (5) demonstrating the ability to identify, investigate and prosecute TF; and (6) demonstrating an effective process to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay. |

| Rulgaria | Since October 2023, when Bulgaria made a high-level political commitment to |
|--------------|---|
| Bulgaria | work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its |
| | AML/CFT regime, Bulgaria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT |
| | regime, including by ensuring that the beneficial ownership information held in |
| | its Register is accurate and up-to-date and by identifying the subset of non-profit |
| | organisations (NPOs) most vulnerable to TF abuse. Bulgaria should continue to |
| | work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, |
| | including by: (1) addressing the remaining technical compliance deficiencies; (2) |
| | improving investigations and prosecutions of different types of money laundering |
| | in line with risks, including high-scale corruption and organised crime; (3) ensuring |
| | the ability to conduct parallel financial investigations in all terrorism |
| | investigations; (4) addressing gaps in the PF TFS frameworks; and (5) |
| | demonstrating initial implementation of risk-based monitoring of NPOs to |
| | prevent abuse for TF purposes. |
| Burkina Faso | In February 2021, Burkina Faso made a high-level political commitment to work |
| Durkina raso | with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, |
| | Burkina Faso should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address |
| | its remaining strategic deficiency, by implementing an effective targeted financial |
| | sanctions regime related to TF and PF. |
| | The FATF notes Burkina Faso's continued progress across its action plan, however |
| | all deadlines have expired and work remains. The FATF urges Burkina Faso to |
| | swiftly implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic |
| | deficiency as soon as possible as all deadlines expired in December 2022. |
| C | In June 2023, Cameroon made a high-level political commitment to work with the |
| Cameroon | FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. |
| | Cameroon has taken steps to improve its AML/CFT regime by aligning AML/CFT |
| | national strategies and policies with the findings of the NRA; demonstrating |
| | AML/CFT cooperation and coordination between competent authorities; |
| | improving risk-based prioritisation of incoming international cooperation, and |
| | establishing a regime for violations of transparency obligations applicable to legal |
| | persons. Cameroon should continue working on implementing its action plan to |
| | address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) enhancing risk-based |
| | supervision of banks and implementing effective risk-based supervision for non- |
| | bank FIs and DNFBPs, and conducting appropriate outreach to high-risk FIs and |
| | DNFBPs; (2) maintaining and ensuring timely access by competent authorities to |
| | adequate and up to date beneficial ownership information on legal persons; (3) |
| * | enhancing secure information exchange between the FIU, reporting entities and |
| | competent authorities and demonstrating an increase in dissemination of |
| | intelligence reports to support operational needs of competent authorities; (4) |
| | demonstrating that authorities are able to conduct a range of ML investigations, |
| | and prosecute ML in line with risks; (5) implementing policies and procedures for |
| | seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime and managing |
| | frozen, seized and confiscated property, and prioritising seizure and confiscation |

of assets at the border; (6) demonstrating that TF investigations and prosecutions are pursued in line with risk; and (7) demonstrating effective implementation of

| | TF and PF TFS regimes and implementing a risk-based approach to NPOs without disrupting legitimate NPO activities. |
|---------------|---|
| côte d'ivoire | In October 2024, Côte d'Ivoire made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in June 2023, Côte d'Ivoire has made significant progress on many of the MER's recommended actions including by strengthening its legal AML/CFT framework through several important legislative and regulatory amendments, updating ML/TF analysis by drafting typology reports on the highest risk predicate offences, strengthening the human and technical resources of the FIU and prosecutors, and operationalising the agency in charge of the management of assets seized and confiscated. Côte d'Ivoire will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) enhancing its use of international cooperation in ML/TF investigations and prosecutions; (2) improving the implementation of risk-based supervision of financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions and conducting outreach campaigns to improve compliance; (3) improving the verification and access of basic and beneficial ownership information of legal persons and applying sanctions in case of violation; (4) enhancing the use of financial intelligence by law enforcement authorities and improving disseminations by the FIU; (5) demonstrating a sustained increase in the number of ML and TF investigations and prosecutions of different types in line with the country's risk profile; and (6) strengthening the targeted financial sanctions framework. |
| Croatia | In June 2023, Croatia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its February 2025 Plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Croatia has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future. Croatia has made the following key reforms including: (1) completing the national risk assessment, including assessing the ML/TF risk associated with the misuse of legal persons and legal arrangements and the use of cash in the real estate sector; (2) increasing FIU human resources and improving analytical capabilities; (3) continuing to improve LEA detection, investigation and prosecution of different types of ML, including ML involving foreign predicate offences and the misuse of legal persons; (4) demonstrating a sustained increase in the application of |

provisional measures in securing direct/indirect proceeds, as well as foreign proceeds subject to confiscation; (5) demonstrating the ability to systematically detect and where relevant investigate TF in line with its risk profile; (6) establishing a national framework for the implementation of UN TFS measures and providing guidance and conducting outreach and training to reporting entities; and (7) identifying the subset of NPOs most vulnerable to TF abuse and providing targeted outreach to NPOs and to the donor community on potential vulnerabilities of NPOs to TF abuse.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Since October 2022, when the DRC made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, the DRC has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by establishing a mechanism to promote interagency coordination and cooperation on both ML and TF at the operational level. The DRC should continue to work to implement its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) developing and implementing a risk-based supervision plan; (2) building the capacity of the FIU to conduct operational and strategic analysis; (3) strengthening the capabilities of authorities involved in the investigation and prosecution of ML and TF; and (4) demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF-related TFS.

Haiti

(Statement from June 2024)

Since June 2021, when Haiti made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Haiti has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including improving the FIU's access to and use of a wide range of information in its financial intelligence products through the adoption of a new organic law. The FATF recognises the political commitment expressed at a high level and the efforts demonstrated by Haiti to advance its commitments in the midst of the challenging social, economic and security situation within the country. Haiti should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) completing its ML/TF risk assessment process and disseminating the findings; (2) implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions and DNFBPs deemed to constitute a higher ML/TF risk; (3) ensuring basic and beneficial ownership information are maintained and accessible in a timely manner; (4) ensuring the FIU has adequate resources and processes to produce and disseminate operational and strategic analysis to competent authorities for combatting ML and TF; (4) demonstrating authorities are identifying, investigating and prosecuting ML cases in a manner consistent with Haiti's risk profile; (5) demonstrating an increase of identification, tracing and recovery of

| | proceeds of crimes; (6) addressing the technical deficiencies in its targeted financial sanctions regime; and (7) conducting appropriate risk-based monitoring of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities. The FATF notes Haiti's continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines are expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Haiti to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies. |
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| Kenya | Since February 2024, when Kenya made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Kenya has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by completing a TF risk assessment and by bringing its TFS framework related to proliferation financing into compliance. Kenya should continue to work to implement its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by:(1) presenting the results of the NRA and other risk assessments in a consistent manner to competent authorities and the private sector and updating the national AML/CFT strategies; (2) improving risk-based AML/CFT supervision of FIs and DNFBPs and adopting a legal framework for the licensing and supervision of VASPs; (3) enhancing the understanding of preventive measures by FIs and DNFBPs, including to increase STR filing and implement TFS without delay; (4) designating an authority for the regulation of trusts and collection of accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information and implementing remedial actions for breaches of compliance with transparency requirements for legal persons and arrangements; (5) improving the use and quality of financial intelligence products; (6) increasing ML and TF investigations and prosecutions in line with risks; (7) bringing the TFS framework in compliance with R.6 and ensure its effective implementation; and (8) revising the framework for NPO regulation and oversight to ensure that mitigating measures are risk-based and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activity. |
| Lao PDR | In February 2025, Lao PDR made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in August 2023, Lao PDR has made progress on some of the MER's recommended actions including increasing FIU resources and eliminating bearer shares. Lao PDR will continue to work with the FATF to |
| | implement its FATF action plan by: (1) enhancing its understanding of ML/TF risks; (2) improving risk-based supervision of casinos, banks and reporting entities in SEZs, including fit and proper checks; (3) enhancing the quality and quantity of financial intelligence analysis and spontaneous dissemination to law enforcement |

agencies; (4) ensuring law enforcement agencies receive training and guidance on money laundering; (5) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with Lao PDR's risk profile, with an emphasis on crimes with a transnational element that require international cooperation; (6) developing a national confiscation policy consistent with its ML/TF risks; (7) demonstrating that relevant competent authorities are taking measures to identify, seize and, where applicable, confiscate proceeds and instrumentalities of crime in line with the risk profile; (8) monitoring Fis' and DNFBPs' compliance with TFS PF obligations; and (9) addressing technical compliance deficiencies in Recommendations 5, 6, 7 and 10.

Lebanon

(Statement from October 2024)

In October 2024, Lebanon made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime in spite of the challenging social, economic and security situation within the country. Since the adoption of its MER in May 2023, Lebanon has made progress on several of the MER's recommended actions and has applied measures to its financial sector, including through issuing a circular for banks and financial institutions to establish a department dedicated to combating bribery and corruption related crimes and guidance on politically exposed persons, while taking measures against unlicensed financial activity.

Lebanon will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) conducting assessments of specific terrorist financing and money laundering risks identified in the MER and ensuring that policies and measures are in place to mitigate these risks; (2) enhancing mechanisms to ensure the timely and effective execution of requests for mutual legal assistance, extradition and asset recovery; (3) enhancing DNFBPs' risk understanding and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breaches of AML/CFT obligations; (4) ensuring beneficial ownership information is up-todate and that there are adequate sanctions and risk-mitigating in place for legal persons; (5) enhancing competent authorities' use of products of the FIU and financial intelligence; (6) demonstrating a sustained increase in investigations, prosecutions and court rulings for types of ML in line with the risk; (7) improving its approach to asset recovery and identifying and seizing illicit cross-border movements of currency and precious metals and stones; (8) pursuing TF investigations and sharing information with foreign partners related to investigations of TF as called for in the MER; (9) enhancing the implementation of targeted financial sanctions without delay, particularly at

| | DNFBPs and certain non-banking financial institutions; and (10) undertaking targeted and risk-based monitoring of high-risk NPOs, without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities. |
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| Mali | In October 2021, Mali made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its February 2025 plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Mali has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future. |
| | Mali has made key reforms by: (1) disseminating the results of the NRA to all relevant stakeholders including by conducting awareness raising activities with the highest risk sectors; (2) developing a risk based approach for the AML/CFT supervision of all FIs and higher risk DNFBPs and demonstrating effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for noncompliance; (3) conducting a comprehensive assessment of ML/TF risks associated with all types of legal persons; (4) increasing the capacity of the FIU and the LEAs and enhancing their cooperation on the use of financial intelligence; (5) ensuring relevant competent authorities are involved in investigation and prosecution of ML; (6) strengthening the capacities of relevant authorities responsible for investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (7) establishing a legal framework and procedures to implement targeted financial sanctions; and (8) implementing a risk-based approach for supervision of the NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes. |
| Monaco | (Statement from June 2024) |
| | In June 2024, Monaco made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its, mutual evaluation report (MER) in December 2022, Monaco has made significant progress on several of the MER's recommended actions including by establishing a new combined financial intelligence unit (FIU) and AML/CFT supervisor, strengthening its approach to detecting and investigating terrorism financing, implementing targeted financial sanctions and risk-based supervision of non-profit organisations. Monaco will continue to work with FATF to implement its action plan by: (1) strengthening the understanding of risk in relation to money laundering and income tax fraud committed abroad; (2) demonstrating a sustained increase in outbound requests to identify and seek the seizure of criminal assets abroad (3) enhancing the application of sanctions for AML/CFT breaches and breaches of basic and beneficial ownership requirements; (4) completing its resourcing program for its |

| | FIU and strengthen the quality and timeliness of STR reporting; (5) enhancing judicial efficiency, including through increasing resources of investigative judges and prosecutors and the application of effective, dissuasive and proportionate sanctions for money laundering; and (6) increasing the seizure of property suspected to derive from criminal activities. |
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| Mozambique | Since October 2022, when Mozambique made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Mozambique has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by implementing a risk-based supervision plan along with effective and proportionate sanctions, increasing financial intelligence sent to authorities and demonstrating the ability to identify TF cases. Mozambique should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) carrying out a risk assessment for NPOs in line with the FATF Standards and using it as a basis to develop an outreach plan. |
| Namibia | Since February 2024, when Namibia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CF regime, Namibia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime including by strengthening FIU resources dedicated to both its supervision |
| | responsibilities and operational and strategic analysis, and increasing the LEAs financial and human resources dedicated to TF. Namibia should continue working on implementing its FATF action plan to address strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) strengthening its AML/CFT risk based supervision through conducting offsite and onsite inspections informed by supervisory risk assessment tools are applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breaches of AML/CFT obligations; (2) enhancing preventive measures through inspections and outreach to ensure that FIs and DNFBPs apply enhanced due diligence measure as well as TFS obligations related to TF and PF without delay; (3) increasing the filing of beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements, and applying remedial actions and/or effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions against breaches of compliance with beneficial ownership obligations (4) improving the cooperation between the FIU and LEAs to enhance the use an integration of financial intelligence in investigations; (5) enhancing the operational capabilities of authorities involved in ML investigations and prosecutions by providing them with adequate resources and targeted trainings (6) demonstrating the LEAs' capabilities to effectively investigate and prosecutions. |

| Nepal | In February 2025, Nepal made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in August 2023, Nepal has made progress on some of the MER's recommended actions including streamlining MLA requests and increasing the capabilities of the FIU. Nepal will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) improving its understanding of key ML/TF risks; (2) improving risk-based supervision of commercial banks, higher risk cooperatives, casinos, DPMS and real estate sector; (3) demonstrating identification and sanctioning of materially significant illegal MVTS/hundi providers, without hindering financial inclusion; (4) increasing capacity and coordination of competent authorities to conduct ML investigations; (5) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions; (6) demonstrating measures to identify, trace, restrain, seize and, where applicable, confiscate proceeds and instrumentalities of crime in line with the risk profile; (7) addressing technical compliance deficiencies in its targeted financial sanctions regime for TF and PF. |
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| Nigeria | Since February 2023, when Nigeria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Nigeria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by improving AML/CFT risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs, ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information on legal persons and demonstrating a sustained increase in ML and TF investigations and prosecutions in line with the country's risk profile Nigeria should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) enhancing implementation of preventive measures for high-risk sectors; and (2) proactively detecting violations of currency declaration obligations and applying appropriate sanctions. |
| South Africa | Since February 2023, when South Africa made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, South Africa has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime including by demonstrating that all supervisors apply effective, proportionate, and effective sanctions, ensuring competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up to date BO information on legal persons and arrangements and applying sanctions for breaches of violation by legal persons to beneficial ownership obligations. South Africa should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its remaining strategic deficiency on demonstrating a sustained increase in investigations and prosecutions of serious |

| | and complex money laundering and the full range of TF activities in line with its risk profile. |
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| South Sudan | Since June 2021, when South Sudan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, South Sudan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by finalising its comprehensive review of the AML/CFT Act (2012) to comply with the FATF Standards. South Sudan should continue to work to implement its action plan, including by: ; (1) fully implementing the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 2000 Palermo Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention; (2) ensuring that competent authorities are suitably structured and capacitated to implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision for financial institutions; (3) developing a comprehensive legal framework to collect and verify the accuracy of beneficial ownership information for legal persons; (4) finalising the operationalisation of a fully functioning and independent FIU; (5) establishing and implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and WMD proliferation financing; and (6) commencing implementation of targeted risk-based supervision/monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse. The FATF notes South Sudan's limited progress across its action plan with all |
| | deadlines now expired and work remaining. The FATF again encourages South Sudan to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible and demonstrate strong political and institutional commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, particularly in supporting the lead AML/CFT agency in coordinating national AML/CFT efforts. |
| Syria | (Statement from February 2023) |
| | Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work |
| | with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria |
| | has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF |
| | determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and establishing procedures for |
| | freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its |
| | agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to |
| | conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the |
| | required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF wil |

| | continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date. |
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| Tanzania | In October 2022, Tanzania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its February 2025 plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Tanzania has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future. |
| | Tanzania has made the following key reforms: (1) improving risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs, including by conducting inspections on a risk-sensitive basis and applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance; (2) demonstrating authorities' capability to effectively conduct a range of investigations and prosecutions of ML in line with the country's risk profile; (3) demonstrating that LEAs are taking measures to identify, trace, seize, and confiscate proceeds and instrumentalities of crime; (4) conducting a comprehensive TF Risk Assessment and begin implementing a comprehensive national CFT strategy as well as demonstrating capability to conduct TF |
| | investigations and pursue prosecutions in line with the country's risk profile; (5) increasing awareness of the private sector and competent authorities on TF and PF-related TFS; and (6) carrying out the TF risk assessment for NPOs in line with the FATF Standards and using it as a basis to develop an outreach plan. |
| Venezuela | In June 2024, Venezuela made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Venezuela should continue working on implementing its FATF action plan to address its strategic deficiencies by: (1) strengthening its understanding of ML/TF risks including in relation to TF and legal persons and arrangements; (2) ensuring the full range of financial institutions and DNFBPs are subject to AML/CFT measures and risk-based supervision; (3) ensuring adequate, accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information is accessible in a timely manner; (4) enhancing the resources of the FIU and improving competent authorities' use of financial intelligence; (5) enhancing the investigation and prosecution of ML and TF; (6) ensuring measures to prevent the abuse of NPOs for TF are targeted proportionate, and risk-based and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate activities within the NPO sector; and (7) implementing TF-and PF-related targeted financial sanctions without delay |

Vietnam

Since June 2023, when Vietnam made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Vietnam has made limited progress. The FATF strongly encourages Vietnam to coordinate internally to demonstrate progress on its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) increasing risk understanding, domestic coordination and co-operation to combat ML/TF; (2) enhancing international cooperation; (3) implementing effective risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs; (4) taking action to regulate virtual assets and virtual asset service providers; (5) addressing technical compliance deficiencies, including with respect to the ML offence, targeted financial sanctions, customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting; (6) conducing outreach activities with the private sector; (7) establishing a regime that provides competent authorities with adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on beneficial ownership; (8) ensuring the independence of the FIU and enhancing the quality and quantity of financial intelligence analysis and disseminations; (9) prioritizing parallel financial investigations and demonstrating an increase in the number of ML investigations and prosecutions undertaken; and (10) demonstrating that there is monitoring of FIs and DNFBPs for compliance with PF TFS obligations and that there is cooperation and co-ordination between authorities to prevent PF TFS from being evaded.

Yemen

(Statement from February 2023)

Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

القسم الثالث: الدول التي تم حذفها من القائمة الرمادية

Jurisdiction No Longer Subject to Increased Monitoring by the FATF

PHILIPPINES

The FATF welcomes the Philippines' significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. The Philippines strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in June 2021 by (1) demonstrating that effective risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is occurring; (2) demonstrating that supervisors are using AML/CFT controls to mitigate risks associated with casino junkets; (3) implementing the new registration requirements for MVTS and applying sanctions to unregistered and illegal remittance operators; (4) enhancing and streamlining LEA access to BO information and taking steps to ensure that BO information is accurate and up-to-date; (5) demonstrating an increase in the use of financial intelligence and an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; (6) demonstrating an increase in the identification, investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (7) demonstrating that appropriate measures are taken with respect to the NPO sector (including unregistered NPOs) without disrupting legitimate NPO activity; (8) enhancing the effectiveness of the targeted financial sanctions framework for both TF and PF; and (9) applying cross-border measures in all main international sea/airports, in line with the risk.

The Philippines should continue to work with APG to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system. The FATF encourages the Philippines to continue its work in ensuring that its CFT measures are appropriately applied, particularly the identification and prosecution of TF cases, and are neither discouraging nor disrupting legitimate NPO activity.