

هيئة سوق رأس المال Capital Market Authority

الإشارة: ه.س.ر.ف/ ديوان 2024/27500

التاريخ: 2024/10/29

حضرة السادة بورصة فلسطين المحترمين

حضرة السادة شركات الأوراق المالية المحترمين

حضرة السادة شركات التأمين المحترمين

حضرة السادة شركات التأجير التموبلي المحترمين

تحيه طيبة وبعد،

الموضوع: تعميم قرار بشأن قوائم الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة.

بالإشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه، واستناداً إلى أحكام القرار بقانون رقم (39) لسنة 2022 بشأن مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، وبناءً على القرار الصادر عن السادة وحدة المتابعة المالية رقم (2024/3) بشأن قوائم الدول عالية المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة.

ولحماية النظام المالي من اية مخاطر تتعلق بجرائم غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب أو انتشار التسلح، يتوجب على كافة القطاعات الخاضعة لإشراف ورقابة الهيئة تنفيذ متطلبات القرار أعلاه، واتخاذ التدابير اللازمة بمقتضاه.

كما وتنوه الهيئة، لضرورة الأخذ بعين الاعتبار المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه قصور أنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب للدول المدرجة في القائمة الرمادية وذلك عند اجراء التقييم الذاتي لمخاطر غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب. كما ويجب ان يتم تطبيق النهج القائم على المخاطر الذي يأخذ بعين الاعتبار كافة عوامل المخاطر المتعلقة بالعملاء، والمنتجات والخدمات والعمليات، وقنوات التسليم، والدول والمناطق الجغرافية بحيث تكون الإجراءات المتخذة متناسبة ومتسقة مع نتائج تحليل المخاطر المختلفة وطبيعة تلك المخاطر.

وتفضلوا بقبول فائق الاحترام



- مرفق قرار رقم (2024/3) الصادر عن وحدة المتابعة المالية بتاريخ 2024/10/27.
 - نسخة الإدارة العامة للأوراق المالية.
 - نسخة الإدارة العامة للتأمين.
 - نسخة الإدارة العامة للرهن العقاري والتأجير التمويلي.

970 2 294 6946 🖶 +970 2 294 6947 🏐 www.pcma.ps 🖾 diwan@pcma.ps رئي سفة رئرد

P.O.Box 4041, Ramallah & Al-Bireh P6100047

Financial Follow-Up Unit

State of Palestine



وحدة المتابعة المالية

دولة فلسطين

قرار رقم (2024/3) صادر عن وحدة المتابعة المالية بتاريخ 2024/10/27م

بشأن قوائم الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة

استناداً إلى احكام قرار بقانون رقم (39) لسنة 2022م بشأن مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب وتعديلاته، لا سيما أحكام المادة (20) والفقرات (3 ، 4) من المادة (30)، وبناءً على قرار اللجنة الوطنية لمكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب رقم (8/ج4/2016) الصادر بتاريخ 2016/12/01م، بشأن تفويض وحدة المتابعة المالية بنشر قائمة الدول عالية المخاطر والتي تصدر بشكل دوري عن مجموعة العمل المالي (FATF)، ولاحقاً لما تقرر عن المجموعة منذ تاريخ 2020/02/21، وحتى تاريخ 2024/10/25 وحتى تاريخ 2024/10/25) الصادر بتاريخ 2020/10/25 من المراد وعلى الإرهاب رقم (ت/2020) الصادر بتاريخ 2020/02/24 من الدول مرتفعة المخاطر والدول تحت المتابعة المعززة.

وبناءً على مقتضيات المصلحة العامة، تقرر ما يلي:

أولاً قائمة الدول مرتفعة المخاطر (القائمة السوداء) يجب على كافة المؤسسات المالية والاعمال والمهن غير المالية المحددة في دولة فلسطين استمرار العمل بالإجراءات التالية تجاه الدول عالية المخاطر:

| الإجراءات المطلوبة تجاه الدّول | الدّولة |
|--|-----------------------|
| تطبیق العقوبات المالیة المستهدفة بما ینسجم مع احکام المرسوم التنفیذي رقم | - جمهورية كوريا |
| (2022/14) بشأن تنفيذ قرارات مجلس الأمن. | الديموقراطية الشعبية |
| 2. إيلاء اهتمام خاص للعلاقات التجاربة والمعاملات مع تلك الدّول، بما في ذلك | (كوربا الشمالية). |
| الشركات والمؤسسات المالية، وتطبيق الإجراءات المضادة التالية: | |
| أ. اتخاذ اجراءات العناية الواجبة المعززة على علاقات العمل والعمليات مع تلك | - الجمهورية الإسلامية |
| الدّول (كجزء من التدابير المضادة)، وبما يتناسب مع المخاطر الناشئة فيها، وذلك | الإير انية (إيران). |
| وفق تفاصيل المواد (26، 27) من تعليمات اللجنة الوطنية رقم (4) لسنة 2022م | |
| الخاصة بالمؤسسات المالية، والمواد (24، 25) من تعليمات اللجنة الوطنية رقم | |
| (3) لسنة 2022م الخاصة بالأعمال والمهن غير المالية المحددة. | |

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وحــدة المتابعــة الماليــة

دولة فلسطين

| ب. تطبيق إجراءات العناية الواجبة المعززة المشار الها في الفقرة (أ) من هذا البند عند | | | | |
|---|----|---------|-------|------------|
| التعامل مع أي جهة تعمل بالنيابة عن الشخص الطبيعي او الاعتباري بما فيها | | | | |
| الشركات أو المؤسسات المالية العاملة في تلك الدول. | | | | |
| ج. تعزيز أليات الإبلاغ المعتمدة لدى المؤسسة المالية أو احدى الاعمال والمهن غير | | | | |
| المالية، بما يشمل زبادة التعاون بين الموظفين وسرعة تزويد البيانات لمسؤول | | | | |
| مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب داخل المؤسسة المالية أو احدى الاعمال | | | | |
| والمهن غير المالية، وذلك لضمان عدم تنفيذ أي عملية أو معاملة يشتبه بأنها | | | | |
| تتضمن جريمة غسل الأموال أو احدى الجرائم الاصلية المرتبطة بها أو تمويل | | | | |
| الإرهاب، وإبلاغ الوحدة بصورة فورية ودون تأخير عن هذا الاشتباه، وتزويدها | | | | |
| بكافة البيانات المتعلقة بمحاولة ابرام تلك العمليات، مع ضمان سرية الإبلاغ | | | | |
| وعدم اشعار العميل. | | | | |
| د. عدم إنشاء فروع او مكاتب تمثيلية أو شركات تابعة في تلك الدول. | | | | |
| ه. عدم الاعتماد على أطراف ثالثة متواجدة في تلك الدول في اتخاذ أي من إجراءات | | | | |
| العناية الواجبة تجاه العملاء. | | | | |
| و. عدم إنشاء أي علاقات مراسلة مصرفية أو علاقات مراسلة مشابهة مع المؤسسات | | | | |
| المالية في تلك الدول. | | | | |
| تطبيق اجراءات العناية الواجبة المعززة على علاقات العمل والعمليات مع ماينمار ، | .1 | ماينمار | اتحاد | جمهورية |
| وبما يتناسب مع المخاطر الناشئة في الدّولة، وذلك وفق تفاصيل المواد (26، 27) من | | 1 100 | | (ماينمار). |
| تعليمات اللجنة الوطنية رقم (4) لسنة 2022م الخاصة بالمؤسسات المالية، والمواد | | | | |
| (25، 24) من تعليمات اللجنة الوطنية رقم (3) لسنة 2022م الخاصة بالأعمال والمهن | | | | |
| غير المالية المحددة. | | | | |
| عند تطبيق تدابير العناية الواجبة المعززة، يجب ضمان عدم تعطيل تدفقات الأموال | .2 | | | |
| للمساعدة الإنسانية وأنشطة المنظمات غير الربحية المشروعة والتحويلات المالية. | | | | |
| 2 3 3 2 | | | | |

ثانيأ

قائمة الدول تحت المتابعة المعززة (القائمة الرمادية)

تعديل قائمة الدول تحت المتابعة المعززة (القائمة الرمادية) المنصوص عليها في قرار الوحدة رقم (2024/2) وذلك بإضافة كل من (لبنان، الجز ائر، أنغولا، ساحل العاج "كوت ديفوار")، وحذف (السنغال)، لتصبح القائمة كما بالجدول أدناه، والأخذ بعين الاعتبار المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه القصور في أنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب لهذه الدول (وفقاً

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وحدة المتابعة المالية

دولة فلسطين

للملحق المرفق بهذا القرار) وذلك عند اجراء التقييم الذاتي لمخاطر غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، بما يشمل تحديد وتحليل وتقييم تلك المخاطر.

| اسم الدولية | الرقم | اسم الدولة | الرقم |
|-----------------------------------|-------|---------------------------|-------|
| موناكو | 13 | الجزائر | 1 |
| جمهورية موزمبيق | 14 | أنغولا | 2 |
| جمهورربة ناميبيا | 15 | بلغاربا | 3 |
| جمهورية نيجيريا | 16 | بوركينا فاسو | 4 |
| جمهورية الفليين | 17 | الكاميرون | 5 |
| جمهورية جنوب افريقيا | 18 | ساحل العاج (كوت ديفوار) | 6 |
| جمهورية جنوب السودان | 19 | كرواتيا | 7 |
| الجمهورية العربية السورية (سوريا) | 20 | جمهورية كونغو الديمقراطية | 8 |
| جمهورية تنزانيا | 21 | جمهورية هايتي | 9 |
| فنزويلا | 22 | جمهورية كينيا | 10 |
| فيتنام | 23 | جمهورية لبنان | 11 |
| الجمهورية اليمنية (اليمن) | 24 | جمهوربة مالي | 12 |

ثالثاً

التنفيذ

يجب على كافة المؤسسات المالية والأعمال والمهن غير المالية المحددة، تنفيذ أحكام هذا القرار ويعمل به من تاريخ تعميمه.

مديروحدة المتابعة المالية

المرقق: المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه القصور في أنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب.

المخاوف المتعلقة بأوجه القصور في أنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب في الدول

* القسم الأول: أوجه القصور من خلال تقارير التقييم (لكافة الدول):

يوضح هذا القسم، كيفية الوصول الى المخاوف المتعلقة بنظام مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب وتمويل انتشار التسلح لدى الدول المدرجة في القائمة الرمادية، إضافة الى كافة الدّول الأخرى التي تخضع للتقييم المتبادل من قبل مجموعة العمل المالي أو المجموعات النظيرة، ويمكن الوصـــول الى تلك المخاوف من الاطلاع على تقارير التقييم المتبادل المتعلقة بتلك الدول، والتقارير المتابعة اللاحقة لهذا التقرير.

وتحتوي تقارير التقييم المتبادل التقييم المتبادل (mutual evaluation reports) وتقارير المتابعة (follow-up reports) المنشورة على موقع مجموعة العمل المالي أو مجموعة العمل المالي لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط وشرمال أفريقيا، على كافة أوجه القصرو والاستنتاجات الرئيسية المتعلقة بنظام مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب في الدول المدرجة على قائمة المتابعة المعززة وكافة الدول الأخرى التي خضعت للتقييم، ويمكن الحصول على تلك وفق الآلية التالية:

- أ. الوصول الى تقارير التقييم المتبادل باللغة الإنجليزية (لكافة الدول).
 - الدخول الى الموقع الالكتروني: www.fatf-gafi.org
 - 2. من قائمة المواضيع (Topics) نختار (Mutual Evaluations).
 - 3. اختر Mutual Evaluation Reports
 - 4. البحث عن اسم الدولة باللغة الإنجليزية على نافذة البحث.
 - ب. الوصول الى تقارير التقييم المتبادل باللغة العربية (للدول الخاضعة لتقييم مجموعة العمل المالي لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا).
 - 1. الدخول الى الموقع الالكتروني:
 - www.menafatf.org/ar .2
 - اختيار بند (التقييم المتبادل) ثم (تقارير التقييم الجولة الثانية من التقييم)، أو تقارير المتابعة.
 - 4. اختيار التقرير من القائمة التي تظهر حسب اسم الدولة.



القسم الثاني: تنفيذ خطط العمل لمعالجة أوجه القصور

قدّمت الدول المدرجة على القائمة الرمادية النزاماً سياسياً عالياً لمعالجة أوجه القصور الاستراتيجية المتعلقة بأنظمة مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، وما زالت تلك الدول تنفذ التزاماتها لمعالجة باقي أوجه القصور.

وتوضح البنود ادناه المحاور الأساسية التي تعمل تلك الدول على معالجتها أو تلك التي تم معالجتها والتي تعتمد على أوجه القصور المحددة وفقاً لتقارير النقييم المتبادل وتقارير المتابعة، حيث يجب أخذها بعين الاعتبار سواء كانت سلبية أم إيجابية:

| الدولة | المحاور الأساسية |
|---------|---|
| Algeria | In October 2024, Algeria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its mutual evaluation report (MER) in May 2023, Algeria has made progress on many of the MER's recommended actions including by more effectively pursuing money laundering investigations and prosecutions. Algeria will continue to work with FATF to implement its action plan by: (1) improving risk-based supervision, especially for higher risk sectors, including through the adoption of new procedures, risk assessments, supervision manuals and guidelines, as well as undertaking inspections and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions; (2) developing an effective framework for basic and beneficial ownership information; (3) enhancing its regime for suspicious transaction reports; (4) establishing an effective legal and institutional framework for targeted financial sanctions for terrorism financing; and (5) implementing a risk-based approach to oversight of non-profit organisations, without disrupting or discouraging legitimate activity. |
| Angola | In October 2024, Angola made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in June 2023, Angola has made progress on some of the MER's recommended actions including enhancing national cooperation and coordination, international cooperation and the use of financial intelligence by competent authorities. Angola will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) enhancing its understanding of ML/TF risks; (2) improving risk-based supervision of non-financial banking entities and DNFBPs; (3) ensuring competent authorities have adequate, accurate and timely access to beneficial ownership information and that breaches to obligations are adequately addressed; (4) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions; (5) demonstrating the ability to identify, investigate and prosecute TF; and (6) demonstrating an effective process to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay. |

| Bulgaria | Since October 2023, when Bulgaria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Bulgaria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by demonstrating initial implementation of its national action plan for its AML/CFT Strategy; demonstrating initial implementation of risk-based supervision for postal money operators, currency exchange providers and real estate agents and ensuring that confiscation is pursued as a policy objective. Bulgaria should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) addressing the remaining technical compliance deficiencies; (2) ensuring that the beneficial ownership information held in the Register is accurate and up-to-date; (3) improving investigations and prosecutions of different types of money laundering in line with risks, including high-scale corruption and organised crime; (4) ensuring the ability to conduct parallel financial investigations in all terrorism investigations; (5) addressing gaps in the PF TFS frameworks; and (6) identifying the subset of non-profit organisations (NPOs) most vulnerable to TF abuse and demonstrating initial implementation of risk-based monitoring to prevent abuse for TF purposes. |
|--------------|---|
| Burkina Faso | Since February 2021, when Burkina Faso made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Burkina Faso has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by strengthening supervision of financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions, establishing a system to provide access to competent authorities of accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information, and implementing a framework for the monitoring of the activities of NPOs at risk of TF abuse. Burkina Faso should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its remaining strategic deficiency, by: implementing an effective targeted financial sanctions regime related to TF and PF. The FATF notes Burkina Faso's continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have expired and work remains. The FATF urges Burkina Faso to |
| | swiftly implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiency as soon as possible as all deadlines expired in December 2022. |
| Cameroon | In June 2023, Cameroon made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Cameroon should continue working on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) aligning AML/CFT national strategies and policies with the findings of the NRA and monitoring their implementation, and demonstrating AML/CFT cooperation and coordination between competent authorities; (2) ensuring risk-based prioritisation of incoming international |

cooperation requests in line with risks and responding in an effective manner; (3) enhancing risk-based supervision of banks and implementing effective riskbased supervision for non-bank FIs and DNFBPs, and conducting appropriate outreach to high-risk FIs and DNFBPs; (4) maintaining and ensuring timely access by competent authorities to adequate and up to date beneficial ownership information on legal persons, and establishing a sanctions regime for violations of transparency obligations applicable to legal persons; (5) enhancing secure information exchange between the FIU, reporting entities and competent authorities and demonstrating an increase in dissemination of intelligence reports to support operational needs of competent authorities; (6) demonstrating that authorities are able to conduct a range of ML investigations, and prosecute ML in line with risks; (7) implementing policies and procedures for seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime and managing frozen, seized and confiscated property, and prioritising seizure and confiscation of assets at the border; (8) demonstrating that TF investigations and prosecutions are pursued in line with risk; and (9) demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF TFS regimes and implementing a risk-based approach to NPOs without disrupting legitimate NPO activities.

Côte D'ivoire

In October 2024, Côte d'Ivoire made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in June 2023, Côte d'Ivoire has made significant progress on many of the MER's recommended actions including by strengthening its legal AML/CFT framework through several important legislative and regulatory amendments, updating ML/TF analysis by drafting typology reports on the highest risk predicate offences, strengthening the human and technical resources of the FIU and prosecutors, and operationalising the agency in charge of the management of assets selzed and confiscated. Côte d'Ivoire will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) enhancing its use of international cooperation in ML/TF investigations and prosecutions; (2) improving the implementation of risk-based supervision of financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions and conducting outreach campaigns to improve compliance; (3) improving the verification and access of basic and beneficial ownership information of legal persons and applying sanctions in case of violation; (4) enhancing the use of financial intelligence by law enforcement authorities and improving disseminations by the FIU; (5) demonstrating a sustained increase in the number of ML and TF investigations and prosecutions of different types in line with the country's risk profile; and (6) strengthening the targeted financial sanctions framework.

| Croatia | Since June 2023, when Croatia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Croatia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including increasing FIU human resources and improving analytical capabilities; improving LEAs detection, investigation and prosecution of different types of ML; and increasing the application of provisional measures to secure criminal proceeds. Croatia should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its remaining strategic deficiency: demonstrating immediate communication of changes in UN TFS regimes to reporting entities. |
|-----------------|--|
| The Democratic | Since October 2022, when the DRC made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT |
| Republic of the | regime, the DRC has taken steps towards improving its AMI./CFT regime, including by providing training to supervisory authorities and the FIU to build |
| | their technical capacity. The DRC should continue to work to implement its FATF |
| Congo | action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) developing and |
| | implementing a risk-based supervision plan; (2) building the capacity of the FIU |
| | to conduct operational and strategic analysis; (3) strengthening the capabilities |
| * | of authorities involved in the investigation and prosecution of ML and TF; and |
| | (4) demonstrating effective implementation of TF and PF-related TFS. |
| Haiti | (Statement from June 2024) |
| Tialli | |
| | Since June 2021, when Haiti made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Haiti has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including improving the FIU's access to and use of a wide range of information in its financial intelligence products through the adoption of a new organic law. The FATF recognises the political commitment expressed at a high level and the efforts demonstrated by Halti to advance its commitments in the midst of the challenging social, economic and security situation within the country. Haiti should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) completing its ML/TF risk assessment process and disseminating the findings; (2) implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions and DNFBPs deemed to constitute a higher ML/TF risk; (3) ensuring basic and beneficial ownership information are maintained and accessible in a timely manner; (4) ensuring the FIU has adequate resources and processes to produce and disseminate operational and strategic analysis to competent authorities for combatting ML and TF; (4) demonstrating authorities are identifying, investigating and prosecuting ML cases in a manner consistent |

with Haiti's risk profile; (5) demonstrating an increase of identification, tracing and recovery of proceeds of crimes; (6) addressing the technical deficiencies in its targeted financial sanctions regime; and (7) conducting appropriate risk-based monitoring of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.

The FATF notes Haiti's continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines are expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Haiti to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies. The FATF notes Haiti's continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines are expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Haiti to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies.

Kenya

(Statement from February 2024)

In February 2024, Kenya made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in September 2022, Kenya has made progress on some of the MER's recommended actions including by making amendments to its AML/CFT legislation to bring its framework in closer compliance with the FATF recommendations and establishing a case management system to better manage its international cooperation requests. Kenya will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) completing a TF risk assessment and presenting the results of the NRA and other risk assessments in a consistent manner to competent authorities and the private sector and updating the national AML/CFT strategies; (2) improving risk-based AML/CFT supervision of FIs and DNFBPs and adopting a legal framework for the licensing and supervision of VASPs; (3) enhancing the understanding of preventive measures by FIs and DNFBPs, including to increase STR filing and implement TFS without delay; (4) designating an authority for the regulation of trusts and collection of accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information and implementing remedial actions for breaches of compliance with transparency requirements for legal persons and arrangements; (5) improving the use and quality of financial intelligence products; (6) increasing ML and TF investigations and prosecutions in line with risks; (7) bringing the TFS framework in compliance with R.6 and R.7 and ensure its effective Implementation; and (8) revising the framework for NPO regulation and oversight

| | to ensure that mitigating measures are risk-based and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activity. |
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| Lebanon | In October 2024, Lebanon made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime in spite of the challenging social, economic and security situation within the country. Since the adoption of its MER in May 2023, Lebanon has made progress on several of the MER's recommended actions and has applied measures to its financial sector, including through issuing a circular for banks and financial institutions to establish a department dedicated to combating bribery and corruption related crimes and guidance on politically exposed persons, while taking measures against unlicensed financial activity. Lebanon will continue to work with the FATF to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) conducting assessments of specific terrorist financing and money laundering risks identified in the MER and ensuring that policies and measures are in place to mitigate these risks; (2) enhancing mechanisms to ensure the timely and effective execution of requests for mutual legal assistance, extradition and asset recovery; (3) enhancing DNFBPs' risk understanding and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breaches of AML/CFT obligations; (4) ensuring beneficial ownership information is up-to-date and that there are adequate sanctions and risk-mitigating in place for legal persons; (5) enhancing competent authorities' use of products of the FIU and financial intelligence; (6) demonstrating a sustained increase in investigations, prosecutions and court rulings for types of ML in line with the risk; (7) improving its approach to asset recovery and identifying and seizing illicit cross-border movements of currency and precious metals and stones; (8) pursuing TF investigations and sharing information with foreign partners related to investigations of TF as called for in the MER; (9) enhancing the implementation of targeted financial institutions; and (10) undertaking targeted and risk-based |
| | monitoring of high-risk NPOs, without disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities. |
| Mali | Since October 2021, when Mali made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Mali has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by improving the robustness of the terrorist financing offence in its domestic legislation, resulting in the ability to better investigate the full scope of terrorism financing activities. Mali should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating timely |

| | access to accurate beneficial ownership information; and (2) demonstrating the effectiveness of its targeted financial sanctions framework related to TF and PF. |
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| | The FATF notes Mali's continued progress across its action plan, however all deadlines have now expired and work remains. The FATF encourages Mali to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible. |
| Monaco | (Statement from June 2024) |
| | In June 2024, Monaco made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its mutual evaluation report (MER) in December 2022, Monaco has made significant progress on several of the MER's recommended actions including by establishing a new combined financial intelligence unit (FIU) and AML/CFT supervisor, strengthening its approach to detecting and investigating terrorism financing, implementing targeted financial sanctions and risk-based supervision of non-profit organisations. Monaco will continue to work with FATF to implement its action plan by: (1) strengthening the understanding of risk in relation to money laundering and income tax fraud committed abroad; (2) demonstrating a sustained increase in outbound requests to identify and seek the seizure of criminal assets abroad (3) enhancing the application of sanctions for AML/CFT breaches and breaches of basic and beneficial ownership requirements; (4) completing its resourcing program for its FIU and strengthen the quality and timeliness of STR reporting; (5) enhancing judicial efficiency, including through increasing resources of investigative judges and prosecutors and the application of effective, dissuasive and proportionate sanctions for money laundering; and (6) increasing the seizure of property suspected to derive from criminal activities. |
| Mozambique | Since October 2022, when Mozambique made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Mozambique has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by improving the risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs, increasing the resources available to its FIU, and providing training to the FIU on the implementation of targeted financial sanctions. Mozambique should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) implementing a risk-based supervision plan, including the implementation of remedial actions and effective and proportionate sanctions; (2) increasing financial intelligence sent to authorities; (3) demonstrating LEAs' capability to effectively investigate a range of ML offences using financial intelligence; (4) demonstrating the ability to identify TF cases; and (5) carrying out |

| | a risk assessment for NPOs in line with the FATF Standards and using it as a basis |
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| | to develop an outreach plan. |
| Namibia | In February 2024, Namibia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Namibia should continue working on implementing its FATF action plan by: (1) strengthening its AML/CFT risk based supervision through enhancing the human and resource capacities, conducting offsite and onsite inspections informed by supervisory risk assessment tools and applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breaches of AML/CFT obligations; (2) enhancing preventive measures through inspections and outreach to ensure that FIs and DNFBPs apply enhanced due diligence measures as well as TFS obligations related to TF and PF without delay; (3) increasing the filing of beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements, and applying remedial actions and/or effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions against breaches of compliance with beneficial ownership obligations; (4) providing the FIU with adequate human and financial resources, as well as trainings, to improve operational and strategic analysis; (5) improving the cooperation between the FIU and LEAs to enhance the use and integration of financial intelligence in investigations; (6) enhancing the operational capabilities of authorities involved in ML and TF investigations and prosecutions by providing them with adequate resources and targeted trainings; (7) demonstrating the LEAs' capabilities to effectively investigate and prosecute ML/TF cases; and (8) approving the amended National Counter Terrorism Strategy. |
| Nigeria | Since February 2023, when Nigeria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Nigeria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by enhancing international cooperation efforts, improving cooperation mechanisms amongst TF investigative bodies and implementing risk-based monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse. Nigeria should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) improving AML/CFT risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs and enhancing implementation of preventive measures for high-risk sectors; (2) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information on legal persons and applying sanctions for breaches of obligations; (3) demonstrating a sustained increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with ML risks; (4) proactively detecting violations of currency declaration obligations and applying appropriate sanctions; and (5) |

| | demonstrating sustained increase in investigations and prosecutions of different types of TF activities in line with the country's risk profile. |
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| Philippines | In June 2021, the Philippines made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. At its October 2024 plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that the Philippines has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment to verify that the implementation of AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future. The Philippines has made the following key reforms including: (1) demonstrating that risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is occurring; (2) demonstrating that supervisors are using AML/CFT controls to mitigate risks associated with casino junkets; (3) implementing the new registration requirements for MVTS and applying sanctions to unregistered and illegal remittance operators; (4) enhancing and streamlining LEA access to BO information and taking steps to ensure that BO information is accurate and up-to-date; (5) demonstrating an increase in the use of financial intelligence and an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; (6) demonstrating an increase in the identification, investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (7) demonstrating that appropriate measures are taken with respect to the NPO sector (including unregistered NPOs) without disrupting legitimate NPO activity; and (8) enhancing the effectiveness of the targeted financial sanctions framework for both TF and PF |
| South Africa | Since February 2023, when South Africa made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, South Africa has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime including by demonstrating a sustained increase in outbound MLA requests, strengthening its AML/CFT supervisory capacity by improving the risk-based supervision of DNFBPs, enhancing its identification, seizure and confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities of a wider range of predicate crimes, in line with its risk profile, updating and implementing its TF strategy and increasing relevant authorities' TF capabilities on the basis of an understanding of its TF risks, as well as ensuring the effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions. South Africa should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its remaining strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating that all AML/CFT supervisors apply effective, proportionate, and effective |

| 1 | sanctions for non-compliance; (2) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate and up-to-date BO information on legal persons and arrangements and applying sanctions for breaches of violation by legal persons to beneficial ownership obligations; (3) demonstrate a sustained increase in investigations and prosecutions of serious and complex money laundering and the full range of TF activities in line with its risk profile. |
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| South Sudan | Since June 2021, when South Sudan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, South Sudan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by disseminating the results of their recently completed NRA to all stakeholders. South Sudan should continue to work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) finalising its comprehensive review of the AML/CFT Act (2012) to comply with the FATF Standards; (2) fully implementing the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 2000 Palermo Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention; (3) ensuring that competent authorities are suitably structured and capacitated to implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision for financial institutions; (4) developing a comprehensive legal framework to collect and verify the accuracy of beneficial ownership information for legal persons; (5) finalising the operationalisation of a fully functioning and independent FIU; (6) establishing and implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and WMD proliferation financing; and (7) commencing implementation of targeted risk-based supervision/monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse. The FATF notes South Sudan's limited progress across its action plan with all deadlines now expired and work remaining. The FATF again encourages South Sudan to continue to implement its action plan to address the above-mentioned strategic deficiencies as soon as possible and demonstrate strong political and institutional commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of Its AML/CFT regime, particularly in supporting the lead AML/CFT agency in coordinating national AML/CFT efforts. |
| Syria | (Statement from February 2023) |
| | Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its |

| | agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date. |
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| Tanzania | Since October 2022, when Tanzania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Tanzania has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by improving the risk-based supervision of FIs and DNFBPs, including by conducting inspections on a risk-sensitive basis and applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance; demonstrating authorities' capability (including through improving the use of financial intelligence and availability of statistics) to effectively conduct a range of investigations and prosecutions of ML in line with the country's risk profile; developing and beginning to implement a comprehensive national CFT strategy; and, using the recently completed TF risk assessment for NPOs as a basis to develop an outreach and training plan. Tanzania should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its remaining strategic deficiency by demonstrating a capability to conduct TF investigations and pursue prosecutions in line with the country's risk profile. |
| Venezuela | (Statement from June 2024) |
| | In June 2024, Venezuela made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the adoption of its MER in November 2022, Venezuela has made progress on some of the MER's recommended actions including by updating its national risk assessment. Venezuela will work to implement its FATF action plan by: (1) strengthening its understanding of ML/TF risks, including in relation to TF and legal persons and arrangements; (2) ensuring the full range of financial institutions and DNFBPs are subject to AML/CFT measures and risk-based supervision; (3) ensuring adequate, accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information is accessible in a timely manner; (4) enhancing the resources of the FIU and improving competent authorities' use of financial intelligence; (5) enhancing the investigation and prosecution of ML and TF; (6) ensuring measures to prevent the abuse of NPOs for TF are targeted, proportionate, and risk-based and do not disrupt or discourage legitimate activities within the NPO sector; and (7) implementing TF-and PF-related targeted financial sanctions without delay. |
| Vietnam | Since June 2023, when Vietnam made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, |

Vietnam has made limited progress. The FATF strongly encourages Vietnam to coordinate internally to demonstrate progress on its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) increasing risk understanding, domestic coordination and co-operation to combat ML/TF; (2) enhancing international cooperation; (3) implementing effective risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs; (4) taking action to regulate virtual assets and virtual asset service providers; (5) addressing technical compliance deficiencies, including with respect to the ML offence, targeted financial sanctions, customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting; (6) conducing outreach activities with the private sector; (7) establishing a regime that provides competent authorities with adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on beneficial ownership; (8) ensuring the independence of the FIU and enhancing the quality and quantity of financial intelligence analysis and disseminations; (9) prioritizing parallel financial investigations and demonstrating an increase in the number of ML investigations and prosecutions undertaken; and (10) demonstrating that there is monitoring of FIs and DNFBPs for compliance with PF TFS obligations and that there is cooperation and co-ordination between authorities to prevent PF TFS from being evaded.

Yemen

(Statement from February 2023)

Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

القسم الثالث: الدول التي تم حذفها من القائمة الرمادية

Jurisdiction No Longer Subject to Increased Monitoring by the FATF

senegal

The FATF welcomes Senegal's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Senegal strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in February 2021 by: (1) demonstrating consistent understanding of ML/TF risks across relevant authorities; (2) seeking international cooperation to facilitate ML/TF investigations and tracing of proceeds of crime located abroad; (3) demonstrating that FIs and DNFBPs are subject to adequate and effective risk-based supervision and sanction measures and that they improve compliance with AML/CFT obligations including by increasing STR reporting and establishing effective internal control mechanisms; (4) maintaining adequate, accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information and ensuring its timely access by competent authorities; (5) increasing the capacity of the FIU staff to conduct analysis and increasing the dissemination of financial intelligence; (6) increasing the capacity of law enforcement authorities in the detection and investigation of ML and predicate offences in line with risk and maintaining statistics on cases investigated and prosecuted; (7) establishing policies and procedures for the identification and seizure of proceeds of crime and demonstrating the effective application of seizing and freezing powers of relevant competent authorities; (8) strengthening the law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities' understanding of TF risks and CFT capacity and demonstrating that TF investigations are in line with Senegal's risk profile; (9) implementing targeted financial sanction regime; and (10) implementing a risk-based monitoring regime for NPOs at risk of abuse for TF purposes.

Senegal should continue to work with GIABA to sustain its improvements in its AML/CFT system.